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Abstract
This paper posits that corporate and technological diversification of firms and their
relatedness in terms of products and technologies will impact their propensity to form
technological alliances. It argues that both higher levels of diversification and greater
relatedness signal superior capabilities and available resources to prospective partners
that will facilitate exploration and exploitation of technological assets in an alliance.
These theoretical conjectures are tested using a dataset of all tire producers worldwide
between 1985 and 1996 that combines detailed firm data on establishment, patenting,
and alliance activities. The results indicate that complementarity in terms of corpo-
rate and technological diversification strategies, as well as partner characteristics (e.g.,
size, age, and technological capabilities) drive exploitation alliances. Moreover, firms
with similar product portfolios are more likely to engage in exploitative interactions.
In contrast, exploration alliances exhibit strong partner similarity across all firm char-
acteristics. Both corporate and technological diversification have positive effects on
firms’ propensity to engage in exploration, while technological distance has a negative
nonlinear one.
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1 Introduction
Most of the world’s corporations are actively engaged in corporate diversification via prod-
ucts, markets or technologies (Rumelt, 1982; Hitt et al., 1997; Suzuki and Kodama, 2004;
Ravichandran et al., 2009) as an avenue to boost performance (Tanrivedi and Lee, 2008)
and develop new core competences (Hitt and Ireland, 1986; Lei et al., 1996). Thus, cor-
porate diversification is commonly employed by firms to consolidate competitive positions
(Penrose, 1959), create positive synergies across divisions (Teece, 1982), insulate against
external threats (Amit and Livnat, 1998), and capitalize on related products and customers
(Tallman and Li, 1996; Miller, 2006). Likewise, technological diversification has been consis-
tently identified as a key contributor to firm growth (Granstrand, 2000), performance (Leten
et al., 2007) and innovation (Huang and Chen, 2010) through significant economies of scale,
scope, speed, and space that complement each other (Fai, 1999). Subsequently, the level
of technological diversification has increased significantly in the last decades (Giuri et al.,
2004), and intricate technological portfolios are common today among leading firms across
many industries (Cantwell and Piscitello, 2000; Quintana-Garcia and Velasco, 2008).
Besides diversification, which mandates significant resource commitments, firms can also
acquire competences and leverage existing assets through external links with other compa-
nies (Stuart, 2000; Giuri et al., 2004; Wang and Zajac, 2007). Driven by technological change
and global competition, exploratory inter-firm agreements that involve bilateral exchanges
of technologies, like public-private partnerships, outsourced or networked R&D and techno-
logical alliances, have gained significant momentum in recent years (Gulati, 1995a; Kale et
al., 2000; Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Gnyawali et al., 2011).1 Similarly, exploitative agreements,
such as subcontracting, original equipment manufacturing (OEM), licensing, or joint venture
projects, that capitalize on existing technological competencies are responsible for signifi-
cant flows of technologies, boosting the productivity of many small- and medium-size firms
in emerging markets (Lee and Beamish, 1995; Narula and Sadowski, 2002). Encapsulated
under the broad concept of technological alliances2 , these interactions have been extensively
employed by firms for both exploitation and exploration (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004; De-
Man and Duysters, 2005; Yamakawa et al., 2011). Nevertheless, these functional types of
alliances are qualitatively different, as explorative agreements focus on the search for new
knowledge, while exploitative ones emphasize the use of existing one (March, 1991).
1For example, in 2003, contracted-out R&D for US manufacturers grew three times faster than the internal
one, public-private R&D partnerships flourished with 2,936 cooperative R&D agreements, and the number
technological alliances worldwide was almost 700 (NSF, 2006).
2This study adopts a broad definition of alliances that includes a range of interactions from simple
contractual agreements (licensing, technology sharing) to establishment of new separate entities (JV) or
joint R&D projects.
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With respect to the drivers of these alliances, the literature has proposed a variety of
explanations that span different levels of analysis (Hagedoorn, 1993; Oxley, 1999; Garcia-
Canal et al., 2008). Accordingly, firms often form alliances to access new markets (Glaister,
1996) and technologies (Kale et al., 2000), while retaining strategic benefits from these
relationships such as lower uncertainty and costs (Narula, 2003) or greater market power
(Kogut, 1991). Yet, the issue of how firms select alliance partners has received less attention
in the literature (Nielsen, 2003). A survey of more than 40 studies suggests that partner
complementarity, commitment, and compatibility (fit) are the key drivers of alliances (Shah
and Swaminathan, 2008). Although all these attributes are vital for forming an alliance,
their effects are contingent on other factors, such as the context of partners (Kale and Singh,
2009), their prior experience (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2008), level of mutual trust (Gulati,
1995b), and idiosyncratic characteristics of managers (Einsehardt and Schoonhoven, 1996)
and agreements themselves (Shah and Swaminathan, 2008).
While this extensive body of research provides many insights into the drivers of alliances,
it still lacks depth in several areas. First, despite the plethora of studies examining diversifi-
cation strategies and alliances, these streams of literature remain in essence autarkic despite
their theoretical relatedness and relevance for firm performance (Mowery et al., 1998; Giuri
et al., 2004). Furthermore, with few exceptions (Fai, 1999; Wang and Zajac, 2007), most
diversification studies adopt a skewed view of this phenomenon, focusing solely on one as-
pect (e.g., product, market, geography or technology). Second, alliances are often examined
at isolated levels of analysis, either the transaction, firm, dyad, or network. Instead, the
recent literature advocates the use of more comprehensive frameworks for analysis across
multiple levels which are better suited for capturing the heterogeneity behind the motives
for forming alliances and providing also richer predictions in the presence of competing ex-
planations (Wang and Zajac, 2007; Duysters et al., 2007; Lin et al., 2009). Finally, most
empirical studies on alliances are confined to high-tech sectors (e.g., IT, electronics, biotech-
nology) and firms from the developed Triad (i.e., North America, Japan and Europe) as
a consequence of data availability across countries and industries (Schilling, 2009). This
restricts significantly the generality of their findings and policy implications regarding non
high-tech industries and developing nations (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2008; Szirmai, 2012), which
remain severely underrepresented in this literature (De Man and Duysters, 2005).
The present study contributes to the literature by focusing on the role of diversification
profiles of firms across two dimensions (corporate and technological) in the formation of
technological alliances for exploration and exploitation. It argues that firms’ choices are de-
termined both by external technological opportunities (to increase, complement, or leverage
existing capabilities) and perceived risks and costs (to coordinate, maintain relationships,
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protect from unwanted spillovers) that are common for both formation of alliances and di-
versification strategies. The proposed contributions target three important aspects. First,
this work introduces theoretical mechanisms for the relation between firm diversification pro-
files and the decision to form technological alliances. Notably, it argues that both corporate
and technological diversification signal superior capabilities and resources that increase the
appeal for an alliance and, moreover, provide additional knowledge to partnering firms on
how to utilize more efficiently their technological assets for exploitation and exploration.
Second, this study adopts a multi-level approach to address the heterogeneity of drivers be-
hind alliance formation (Wang and Zajac, 2007) and jointly examines the effects of firm- and
dyadic- factors on firms’ propensity to form alliances. To this end, it focuses on the effects
of technological and product similarity between prospective partners on alliance formation
as greater similarity allows firms to lower coordination costs, facilitates mutual learning and
takes advantage of existing synergies to improve efficiency. Finally, the empirical investiga-
tion focuses on a mature and low-tech industry (i.e., tires) that is characterized by global
reach, significant R&D efforts at the top, and a great variety of diversification strategies.
Together, these factors recommend the tire industry as a good candidate for testing these
hypotheses, and provide an opportunity to augment the alliance literature by shifting the
focus on intra-firm technology transfers to developing countries and low-tech sectors, which
still account for a large share of production and employment in many economies (Hirsch-
Kreinsen, 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The second section develops testable
hypotheses for the relationship between firms’ diversification profiles and their choices for
technological alliances. Then, the next section describes the dataset, variables employed,
and the estimation choices made in the empirical part followed by a discussion of results
(Section 4) and conclusions (Section 5).
2 Theory and hypotheses
2.1 Alliances as vehicles for technology transfers
Over the past decades, driven by both competitive pressures from globalization and rapid
technological advances across all industries, alliances have become an increasingly popular
avenue to enhance firm competitiveness (Contractor and Lorange, 2002). Conceptualized
as long-term agreements between firms seeking to improve the competitive position of part-
ners by pooling of resources and capabilities (Hagedoorn, 1993), alliances have been used
extensively by firms to access additional resources, minimize transaction costs, and secure
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market advantages (Anand and Khanna, 2000). Moreover, many alliances nowadays exhibit
technological exchanges and target international partners (Narula and Hagedoorn, 1998;
Garcia-Canal et al., 2008). In terms of organizational choices, alliances are extremely flex-
ible, ranging from simple long-term contractual agreements with a narrow focus (e.g., long
standing licensing or technology-sharing agreements) to formation of new entities (e.g., joint-
ventures), all with the goal of maximizing the sought benefits (e.g., mitigate R&D risks, push
new industry standards, access new markets) of such collaborations (Teece, 1986; Wang and
Zajac, 2007).
As a result, technological alliances represent an attractive way for firms to use their tech-
nological knowledge to access complementary assets or secure competitive advantages via
exploration and exploitation (Kim and Inkpen, 2005; Duysters et al., 2007; Sampson, 2007).
While exploration alliances require partners to learn from each other or acquire new knowl-
edge with the specific purpose of creating new capabilities and competences, exploitation
alliances are clearly focused on leveraging existing resources and capabilities for more imme-
diate gains (March, 1991). Although, firms benefit significantly from both types of alliances
(Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), the choice between exploration and exploitation is a result of
heterogeneous factors that stem from firms’ strategic intentions, potential for learning, and
the expected returns from their technological assets (Koza and Lewin 1998). Therefore, it
is imperative to analyze them separately in conjecture with partners’ diversification profiles
and their dyadic similarities, and develop an integrative perspective on the relation between
various diversification types and alliance choices (Figure 1).
2.2 Firm diversification profile
Starting with the seminal work of Penrose (1959), many studies have examined the link
between diversification and firm performance (Palich et al., 2000). However, despite this
large body of work, these effects are still debated in the literature (Hitt et al., 1997). Most
theoretical studies argue that diversified firms will be more successful, as they possess a wider
range of alternative mechanisms (e.g., predatory pricing, cross-subsidization, capital and
labor flexibility) to deal with competitive pressures and environmental uncertainty. These
mechanisms allow them to be more proficient in exploiting their market power (Amit and
Livnat, 1988), capitalize on technological resources (Barney, 1997), and take advantage of
economies of scale and scope (Rumelt, 1982). However, at high levels of diversification,
firm’s operating costs surge as well. Thus, as firms expand further away from their core
specialty (e.g., products, markets or technologies), these costs rise sharply (Hitt et al., 1994),
suggesting that intermediate levels of diversification could yield the biggest benefits (Geringer
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Figure 1: Conceptual framework
et al., 1989). This conjecture is confirmed by recent empirical evidence which indicates a
curvilinear relationship between the degree of diversification and firm performance (Palich
et al., 2000), contingent on industry- and firm-specifics (Hitt et al., 1990).
In relation to alliance formation, the size and composition of firm’s technological resources
are indicative of its potential for setting up technological alliances (Rothaermel, 2001) and
licensing deals (Arora et al., 2001). However, this potential is not automatically realized
without additional efforts to manage and nourish such partnerships (Miotti and Sachwald,
2003). When a firm diversifies, it implicitly acquires greater knowledge (of markets, prod-
ucts, consumers, competitors, technologies, etc.), which in turn, allows it to identify better
and faster external opportunities (e.g., form an alliance) for the exploitation and exploration
of its technological capabilities. Therefore, to integrate these different aspects of firm di-
versification in relationship with its choices for technological alliances, I consider markets
and technologies as the two most common aspects of firm diversification strategies (Hitt
et al., 1997; Granstrand, 2000) and argue that they will impact firms’ decision to form a
technological alliance.
2.2.1 Corporate diversification
Corporate diversification means branching out into new business opportunities, either in
the form of new markets or new products, both with important consequences for firm com-
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petitiveness (Rumelt, 1982). For this study I will focus mainly on one aspect of corporate
diversification strategy, namely new markets or niches (Palich et al., 2000). In today’s glob-
alized world, firm activities often sprawl across multiple industries, which makes it difficult
to assign them a single (or even a main) industry affiliation. Some extreme examples of this
would be industrial conglomerates such as General Electric in the USA, Japanese Keiretsus,
or the Korean Chaebols that are actively involved in numerous lines of business. Market
diversification across is defined as the business expansion into new market segments that
have not been targeted in the past, where firms can realize benefits through economies of
scale and superior internal routines3. In general, firms diversify across multiple markets to
consolidate their competitive position, create synergies between divisions, cope efficiently
with competitors, and insulate against external threats (Amit and Livnat 1988).
2.2.2 Technological diversification
Technological diversification is conceptualized as the expansion of firms’ knowledge base into
a wider range of technical fields (Miller, 2006). This increase in the size and depth of firm’s
technological portfolios has become a surging trend in industrialized countries (Breschi et
al., 2003; Leten et al., 2007) emphasizing the role of technology in securing competitive
advantage and market success (Granstrand 2003). Thus, greater technological endowments
bear positive effects on firm economic and innovative performance, leading to a better and
more sustainable competitive position (Suzuki and Kodama, 2004; Huang and Chen, 2010).
Moreover, as technological diversification is a subject of path-dependencies (Cantwell and
Andersen, 1996), it actually represents a good predictor for firms’ long-run productivity and
financial performance (Pavitt, 1998)4.
2.2.3 The relationship between corporate and technological diversification
The relationship between corporate (in the form of either market or product diversification)
and technological diversification is quite complex (Fai, 2004). Patel and Pavitt (1997) were
the first to show that the degree of technological diversification for large firms was much
greater than the product one. Firms tap into different of business niches as a result of
different technological capabilities and products, and these technological bases tend to co-
evolve over time. As a result, technological breadth is often a good predictor for introduction
of new products, which in turn increases its market share and allows it to penetrate new
markets and niches (Pavitt, 1998). Thus, regardless of choices in terms of these diversification
3This is an inter-industry indicator for firm’s success across multiple domains of activity.
4This is an indicator for firm’s overall technological performance.
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strategies (e.g., focus on one or both; concurrently or sequentially), their interaction remains
an important source of firm dynamism and growth over time (Granstrand, 2003). As both the
needs of consumers and the firm competences evolve in response to changes in demand and
competitive position, more resource-business couplings are typically added than scrapped by
firms, which results in increased diversification (Fai, 2004).
In terms of theoretical explanations, the resource-based arguments focus on the related-
ness between products from economies of scale and scope and the limited range of resources.
Alternatively, evolutionary economics emphasizes the evolution of products and markets as
a result of their underlying technologies. Employing routines and learning-by-doing firms
are able to generate slack to be used for product diversification, where search and selection
processes build on existing technological competences, seeking synergies for new corporate
avenues for diversification (Mowery et al., 1998; Piscitello, 2004). Hence, the interplay be-
tween technological and corporate diversification appears to be strong and positive in theory,
but the direction and strength of this relationship are yet to be assessed empirically in the
literature (Fai, 2004).
2.3 Diversification profiles and alliance decisions
Combining arguments from the dynamic capabilities theory (Teece et al., 1997; Luo, 2000)
and organizational learning (Levitt and March, 1988; March, 1991), I argue that firms that
are more diversified across markets and technologies will be more likely to engage in tech-
nological alliances for both exploitative and explorative reasons. This will occur through
several mechanisms.
First, corporate diversification across different markets can be seen both as a substitute
and a complement for technological alliances. In support of the former, firms need to commit
extra resources for the management of both diversification and alliances, and quite often with
similar objectives (Tsang, 1998). Therefore, if a firm is not able to reach certain niches due
to limited resources or capabilities, setting up an alliance with a partner in that market
represents a viable alternative to internal diversification (Giuri et al., 2004). Subsequently,
firms are faced with a ”make, buy or ally” decision, which shifts resources between internal
development of dynamic capabilities via diversification strategies and outsourcing to external
partners via an alliance (Geyskens et al., 2006).
In contrast, market diversification can stimulate alliance formation by providing firms
with additional knowledge on potential avenues to capitalize on existing technological assets
or develop new technical capabilities that meet better the needs of these markets. Thus,
corporate diversification across markets establishes future channels for exploration and ex-
8
ploitation of technological opportunities outside firm’s core-industry (Luo, 2000). Consistent
with these arguments, studies on market diversification in an international context propose
a complementary relationship between resources and capabilities required for alliance for-
mation on one hand, and diversification strategies on the other (Tsang, 1998; Brouthers and
Hennart 2007). Moreover, market diversification increases both firms’ appeal as an alliance
partner (given the extended capabilities required to be successful in multiple markets), and
the access to a larger pool of potential partners from all these markets in which it is active.
Hence, diversification provides firms with more options for both exploitation and exploration
of their technological assets (Makino and Delios, 1996). Ultimately, firm’s ability to generate
synergies between its technological competences and its diversification strategies determines
its economic performance (Piscitello, 2004).
Second, technological diversity is directly linked with firm’s involvement in technological
alliances, as highly diversified firms in terms of technology are not able to rely exclusively
on internal R&D efforts (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Many of them need to acquire and
complement their in-house knowledge with external sources such as in-licensing or joint re-
search with third parties, e.g., research institutes, universities, and even competitors (Narula,
2003). In these cases, firms with large technology portfolios rely heavily on external sources of
knowledge through either acquisition, outsourcing or collaboration (Granstrand, 2000; Cas-
siman and Veugelers, 2006). Despite this, sharing technology with other firms in the industry
is a double-edge sword. On one end, it implies a negative relationship between technological
diversity and alliances, since firms would like to maintain exclusive rights on internal tech-
nical expertise, and therefore minimize any possible spillovers to competitors (Rivette and
Kline, 1999; Granstrand, 2000; Lin et al., 2009). Oppositely, most firms have a much larger
base of technologies than products (Gambardella and Torissi, 1998; Breschi et al., 2003) due
to the increasing complexity of product and processes over time (Rycroft and Kash 1999).
Thus, most of these technologically-diversified firms go well beyond their core-business in
terms of technical competencies, and alliances give them the ability to exploit successfully
this pool of technological assets in related industries, or via collaborations with competitors
(Patel and Pavitt, 1997; Gambardella et al., 2007). As a result, technological diversification
brings more exploration and exploitation opportunities, thus encouraging alliance formation
(Giuri et al., 2004)5. Well-diversified firms will prefer to exploit their technical know-how in
alliances where they will act as technology providers to other firms, or seek new possibilities
for exploration in collaborative partnerships with other similar well-endowed firms in terms
of technical know-how.
5Giuri et al. (2004) find a strong correlation (0.83) between firm diversification and involvement in
alliances, contingent on industry and temporal characteristics.
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Finally, tapping the global technology markets (for exploitation) and the quest for tech-
nological partners (for exploration) are both complex processes, marked by continuous trials
and frequent failures (Arora et al., 2001; Kale, Dyer and Singh, 2002). Firms face significant
difficulties in finding appropriate partners for exploitation and exploration, as this requires
balancing different characteristics of prospective partners and their potential impact on the
alliance objectives and success (Kale and Singh, 2009). As a result, the selection of part-
ners for alliances is largely determined by the perception of appropriation and coordination
concerns vis a vis prospective partners (Gulati and Singh, 1998). In this context, diversi-
fication may also reflect knowledge about markets and technologies which a firm acquires
as a byproduct of its activities (Granstrand, 2000). While firms may poses significant tech-
nological assets that cater to both partners within and outside their core market niche,
they often have difficulties in identifying these opportunities, especially in distant areas of
activity. Firms with broader knowledge of other markets, products, and technologies will
take advantage of learning effects and economies of scale and scope (Teece et al., 1997),
increasing further their reach of new alliance partners. Thus, diversity across these dimen-
sions has a positive influence on firms’ prospects for new alliance objectives and prospective
partners (Kogut and Zander, 1992). This reasoning is particularly salient for larger firms
with significant resources for exploitation and exploration of their technologies within their
networks of suppliers and clients, but who are also actively seeking to optimize their return
on technological assets (Teece, 2006).
In accordance with the above arguments, well-diversified firms (across markets and tech-
nologies) will be more likely to get involved in technological alliances altogether, given their
superior dynamic capabilities (Teece 2007). Firms’ degree of diversification reflects their
knowledge of markets and products (Granstrand, 2000) as well as their success in acquiring
external technological knowledge via inter-firm collaborative and licensing agreements (Con-
tractor and Lorange 2002). Hence, as they diversify, firms will be more likely to engage in
alliances for both exploitation and exploration rationales.
Finally, diversification triggers different alliance strategies regarding exploration and ex-
ploitation. Firms with significant abilities (in terms of market and technical know-how) have
the possibility to engage in both exploitative alliances (where they can leverage their tech-
nological assets) and exploration alliances (in which to actively exchange and produce new
technical knowledge). In contrast, firms with lower capabilities, as proxied by lower market
and technological diversification, will be less likely to form technological alliances for explo-
ration, as their technical and corporate know-how is not sufficiently developed to attract the
interest of better-endowed firms in the industry (Koza and Lewin, 2000; Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004). As a result, these firms will be eligible only for exploitative alliance, in which
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they will likely act as recipients of technologies from more diversified and technologically-
endowed partners in exchange for other privileges such as market access, production facilities,
distribution channels (Giuri et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2011).
In light of all these considerations, I propose the following hypotheses:
H1. Corporate and technological diversification of a firm will increase its propen-
sity to engage in exploitation alliances as a provider of technology (a) or in an
exploration alliance as a technological partner (b).
2.4 Dyadic characteristics and alliance decisions
In addition to the individual profiles of prospective partners, their joint characteristics (sim-
ilarities or dissimilarities) are also indicative for alliance formation and subsequently, its
success (Kale and Singh, 2009). Such similarity between firms is generically referred to as
”business relatedness” (Koh and Venkatraman, 1991), but its definition and operationaliza-
tion varies significantly in the literature (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Given that firms’ resources
and capabilities can be conceptualized across multiple dimensions (e.g., products, markets,
technologies) and levels of analysis (e.g., business units, plants, managers), I focus on the
two most common dimensions of business and technological relatedness, namely products
and technologies.
2.4.1 Product similarity
Product similarity is commonly defined as the overlap in the production space between two
partners. Firms seek synergies from collaborations to increase their efficiency levels. Similar
firms poses similar types of assets and operations, yielding immediate gains from collabora-
tions. This conjecture is supported by most empirical findings in the literature. For instance,
Wang and Zajac (2007) show that business similarity (computed using 4 digit NAICS codes)
impacts firms’ decision to ally or acquire. Lee et al. (2008) find a U-shaped relationship
between organizational similarity and the subsequent learning in an alliance. Finally, Yang
et al. (2010) argue that firms’ similarity in terms of status (i.e., its position among peers)
influence their partnering decisions. While the literature suggests that synergistic benefits
are greater from complementary resources in the case of acquisitions (Harrison et al., 2001),
I expand these rationales and argue that product similarity of firms will have a positive effect
on the propensity to form technological alliances.
Alliances present firms with opportunities to enrich their existing technical knowledge
(via exploration) and cash-in on their technological assets (via exploitation). In addition,
they also grant access to partners’ pools of resources and capabilities (Stuart, 2000) with
11
different implications for exploitation and exploration. For the latter, organizational learn-
ing theory suggests that product similarity is a prerequisite for successful alliances, as it
facilitates organizational efficiency (Garette and Dausauge, 2000) and encourages mutual
learning (Teece, 2006). The required consensus over controversial decisions in an alliance
could trigger costly and time consuming negotiations and delays which will affect the success
of the alliance. As a result, similar firms are better positioned to work as alliance partners
that tap into benefits arising from their business similarity (Tanriverdi and Venkatraman,
2005), while reducing costs and uncertainty surrounding the alliance.
Furthermore, exploration alliances are set-up with an explicit goal of acquiring new knowl-
edge (Inkpen, 2001). In turn, this objective mandates similarity (in terms of skills, routines,
products, competences) to meet successfully the learning objectives of these partnerships
(Harrison et al., 2001) and generate economic benefits for firms (Gulati 1995a). Firms with
similar products are more likely to share inputs, technologies and markets, which makes them
more aware of each other’s potential for contributions to the alliance, as well as ex-post ex-
pectations concerning the scope of knowledge transfer and access to privileged information
(Bleeke and Ernst, 1995). Moreover, similarity between partners presents opportunities for
greater value creation in the alliance in the absence of conflicting economic interests and
informational asymmetries (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Thus, explorative endeavors focusing
on learning are more likely to be successful if the two partners are more similar (Mowery et
al., 1998).
In contrast, exploitative alliances are commonly set-up as contract-based partnerships
with a unidirectional transfer of technology, which include licensing, subcontracting, or dis-
tribution agreements (Das and Teng, 2000). In these cases, product similarity is important
for both the provider and the recipient of technology for similar reasons to those mentioned
above. The technology-providing firm will find it more difficult and costly to manage a trans-
fer of knowledge to a partner from a very different fields of activity than its own. Likewise,
the ability of the recipient firm to receive and implement successfully new technologies is
conditioned by the degree of fit with the technology provider (Mowery et al., 1998). When
both prospective alliance partners have more similar product portfolios they are better able
to evaluate each others’ assets, and the ability of the alliance to deliver positive outcomes.
In such situations, firms can benefit easily from complementary assets (i.e., technology is
transferred from one firm to the other in exchange of financial, marketing or production
compensation). Furthermore, product similarity generates natural (i.e., less costly) knowl-
edge about each other, and reduces the existing informational asymmetries surrounding the
alliance (Wang and Zajac, 2007). As a result, product similarity increases firms’ incentives
to form an exploitative alliance by maximizing their joint benefits of resource combinations
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from similar assets and reducing appropriation and coordination concerns (Tanriverdi and
Venkatraman, 2005; Lee et al., 2008).
Following these arguments, I hypothesize that firms which are similar in terms of product
portfolios to be more likely to engage in technological alliance for both exploitation and
exploration:
H2. Product similarity between a pair of firms has a positive effect on their
propensity to form an exploitation alliance (a) or an exploration one (b).
2.4.2 Technological distance
Prior studies of alliance performance and partnering decisions using patent statistics reveals
a positive relationship between technological similarity of partners and alliance occurrence,
especially in high-tech industries where both alliances and large technological portfolios are
quite common (Lane and Lubatkin, 1998; Stuart, 2000; Wang and Zajac, 2007). These
studies rely on the assumption that the technological similarity or relatedness of partners
increases their absorptive capacity, and allows them to tap more successfully into each others’
pools of knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). That ultimately leads to greater diffusion of
knowledge and cross-fertilization of ideas among the alliance partners resulting in more value.
While most existing studies hypothesize a linear relationship between firms’ technological
similarity (or its inverse concept, technological distance) and the decision to ally or acquire,
the evidence about the sign and shape of this relationship remains mixed (Colombo, 2003;
Sampson, 2007).
Similarly to the effects of product similarity on alliance choices, I expect that techno-
logical distance (dissimilarity) to have different implications for firms’ propensity to engage
in exploration and exploitation. Technological distance is a major barrier for the successful
transmission of technical knowledge, as greater distance implies lower absorptive capacity
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Therefore, technologically-distant partners will be conducive
of only exploitative interactions and specialized roles in the alliance: the firm with less ex-
pertise will rely more on external sources of knowledge and act as a recipient of technology
in these exploitative agreements, while its partner will make use of its existing competen-
cies to become a provider of technology. Moreover, greater distance between firms with
limited absorptive capacity will increase coordination and implementation costs for both
partners, as well the the risk of leakage of technical information. These costs and risks will
discourage partners from engaging in these types of agreements when they are very differ-
ent (i.e., distant) in terms of technological portfolios. Therefore, technological distance will
have positive effects on firms’ propensity to engage in exploitation alliances (i.e., technology
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provider-recipient relationships) but this effect would be greater at intermediate levels of
distance.
Likewise, a large distance between prospective partners in terms of technological capabil-
ities will deter the formation of exploration alliances (Sampson, 2007). In these cases, highly
innovative firms will limit their search to the nearest firms in terms of technological assets
(Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007), therefore reducing the coordination and appropriation risks
of the alliance (Gulati and Singh, 1998). This conjecture is supported by the existing em-
pirical evidence, which suggests that firms with less distant technological capabilities are
more likely to form an alliance (Mowery et al., 1998), stimulate cross-learning (Lane and
Lubatkin, 1998) and innovation in the post-alliance period (Ahuja, 2000; Sampson, 2007).
Therefore, greater technological distance is likely to reduce firms’ propensity to engage in
explorative alliances.
However, if technological distance between two prospective partners is zero (i.e., there
is a complete overlap between the technological assets of these firms) the opportunities for
learning are greatly reduced (Hagedoorn, 1993; Yang et al., 2010). Pooling together very
similar resources and competences does not encourage exploration, and leaves little room
for creativity, as partners have little room to learn from each other. Therefore, diversity
in terms of partner technological capabilities may actually increase firm learning (Sampson,
2007) and enhance their absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Subsequently,
firms face a trade-off between choosing a similar (low distance) partner in technological
capabilities but decrease their exploration opportunities, and choose a different (distant) one
that creates more possible combinations and learning avenues but with higher coordination
and appropriation risks. This tension will be even more important for firms in low-tech
industries, where average technological differences across firms are larger than those in high-
tech industries with more even distribution of R&D expenditures across all firms (Hirsch-
Kreinsen, 2008). In light of these arguments, technological distance between two prospective
partners will have a negative and non-linear effect on their propensity to engage in an
exploration alliance.
This yields the final hypothesis:
H3. Technological distance between a pair of firms has a positive effect on their
propensity to form an exploitation alliance (a) and a negative non-linear effect
on their propensity to form an exploration one (b).
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3 Method
3.1 Sample and data collection
The dataset employed in this study includes data on tire producers worldwide between
1985 and 1996, collected from various issues of two industrial journals, namely the Euro-
pean Rubber Journal and Rubber and Plastic News6. The tire industry exhibits a wide
range of international collaborations thus providing a propitious environment for testing
my hypotheses. Its geographic representation has remained constant over the time interval
considered (around 80 countries) and it exhibited positive growth rates for the number of
firms (4%), production plants (2.5%), and active technological alliances (6%) (for details see
Table 2). Regarding the latter, most exploitative alliances (i.e, production/marketing agree-
ments, ongoing licensing, etc.) occur between a firm from a developed country and one from
a developing one, while explorative alliances (i.e., R&D projects, cross-licensing, etc.) form
between firms from developed countries (Table 5 and Table 6). In terms of size, large firms
(i.e, top 50 firms in the industry) are those that engage exclusively in exploitative alliances
as providers of technology and as technological partners in explorative ones, consistent with
the concentration of R&D efforts at the top of the industry 7. Furthermore, most of these
agreements are international, given the overall concentration of the industry at a global level
(e.g., the ”Big Three” -Michelin, Goodyear and Bridgestone- hold around 45% of the global
market.).
The dataset includes details on all tire producers worldwide: location and opening year
of each of their plants, ownership, number of employees, tire types produced, production
technology and capacity. However, given the variance in terms of data availability across
years and countries, the final dataset is an unbalanced panel. Since we are interested in
the occurrence of technological alliances between two firms in the industry, the dataset is
organized as directed dyads to distinguish between providers and recipients of technologies in
the case of exploitation alliances8. In the any dyad ij corresponding to exploitation alliances,
firm i is considered the source (i.e., provider) of technology, while j is the target (recipient)
of it, while for exploration alliance the order of the two firms is random.
6The resulting agreements have been cross-checked with alliance and joint-venture data from Thomson’s
SDC Platinum restricting our search to horizontal agreements involving tire producers.
7For example, the ”Big Three” contribute roughly to almost 40% of the R&D investments, and are
responsible directly or indirectly (i.e, through majority-owned subsidiaries) for a third of the technological
alliances in the industry.
8Thus, in each year we have observations on all the potential alliances between two firms A and B
(on average there are 220 firms active firms each year), resulting in a total of more than 48,000 possible
observations for each year (578,000 over 12 years). After matching these dyads with firm specifics and
variables of interest, the final sample has around 350,000 paired observations
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3.2 Dependent variables and model
The dependent variable captures the probability of an alliance between firm A and firm B
in year t. The purpose of the alliance can be either exploitation or exploration. Thus:
PABtn = F [XAt, XBt, DABt] (1)
where PABt is the probability that A and B will engage in a technological alliance of either
exploitative or explorative nature (n), F is the cumulative probability function, XAt is a set
of A’s characteristics, XBt is a set of B’s characteristics and DABt describe dyad’s character-
istics. Data on the type of these technological alliances comes also from the European Rubber
Journal. Following Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), I code this qualitative information from al-
liance announcements, and distinguish between exploration (i.e., joint R&D projects , R&D
based joint-ventures) and exploitation alliances (i.e., those with a technological component
but mainly concerned with joint marketing, service, OEM, licensing, supply or production)
between all possible firm dyads (pairs). Different from Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), this
study focuses solely on the horizontal dimension of technological alliances and therefore
it does not have a ”hybrid alliance” category, which would combine knowledge-generating
R&D with vertical integration of other activities. This focus on horizontal alliances is driven
both by arguments for theoretical clarity (Phelps, 2010), and the empirical particularities of
the industry, which indicate a very high incidence of technological partnerships exclusively
among tire producers, as the top 20 tire producers are responsible for 80 to 90% of R&D and
innovation in this industry (ERJ, various issues). Hence, I construct two binary dependent
variables which equal 1 if there is an exploitative alliance (Exploit) or an exploratory one
(Explore) and 0 otherwise.
3.3 Independent variables
I measure corporate diversification as the percentage of total sales from other products/services
than tires. This data is available for the 75 largest tire manufacturers in the world from var-
ious issues of the European Rubber Journal. For the rest I assume that their corporate
diversification is zero, which is reasonable given their small assets against the significant
resource requirements to penetrate other markets besides tires. However, to control for
potential biases from these missing observations regarding firms’ sales, I include also a ”no-
data” dummy for all firms that are missing this information. Consistent with my assumption,
these coefficients suggest that, on average, smaller firms are less likely to form an alliance,
especially an explorative one. Furthermore, over time, some tire producers have been ac-
quired by larger conglomerates or divested their efforts to other (non-tire) areas of business
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resulting in extreme values for market diversification9. However, considering their historical
and relative importance for the industry I do not eliminate any of these potential outliers
from my final sample. Instead, I perform some additional checks to make sure that they are
not biasing my results10.
Technological diversification is computed using international patent data from Derwent
Innovation Index (ISI Thomson) across different IPC (International Patent Classification)
classes. All patents contain one or more technology field (IPC) given by a patent examiner
that signals a certain application or technical function. A search in Derwent using keywords
(”tyre” or ”tire”) combined with a manual filtering of recipients based on name matching,
led to the collection of a panel of firm-specific patents focusing on tire technology. An
excerpt of the main (i.e., top 25) classes and sub-classes associated with tire technologies
is given in Table 7 and includes different technological processes that range from produc-
tion of pneumatic or solid tires (B60C; B29D 30/00) to component manufacturing such as
cords (D02G 03/48) or bands (B60C 11/00), and post-production tasks such as pressure
measurements (G01L 17/00), testing (G01M 17/02) or repairing processes (B29C 73/00).
This collection of patents reveals that the knowledge base of this industry extends beyond
tire producers. An example of this broad knowledge base is the growing body of patents
held by different car manufacturers (Honda, Ford, BMW, etc.) in key contingent areas like
automotive, electronics and engineering, which exhibit significant growth potential for the
future. Moreover, this pool of patents suggests that the complexity of tire technologies has
increased over time, as reflected by the growing number of IPC classes, contradicting the
conventional wisdom regarding innovation in a ”low-tech” industry. Using this patent data,
I compute a diversification measure using a technological concentration index for each firm
in the tire industry. Previous studies document that 4-digit level measures are very robust
already (Van Zeebroeck et al., 2006)11. Since I focus on a single industry, I employ a finer
(8 digit) granulation of IPC codes to capture more accurately differences in technological
specialization and the potential overlap between various tire producers.
Thus, the technological diversification index is computed as the inverse of a modified
9Dunlop is one of these cases in which after its acquisition by BTR Plc. many of its operations have been
sold to third parties, resulting in a very small contribution of 1-2% tire sales to BTR’s total sales. Other
outliers are companies such as Nokia Corporation (Finland), Fulda (Germany); Inoue Rubber (Thailand);
Trelleborg AB (Sweden) that have aggressively diverted their focus to contingent areas such as industrial
elastomer parts, electronics and automotive, advanced polymers, etc., which have also resulted in lower
contribution of tire to their total sales
10In an additional analysis I eliminate all firms with percent of sales from tires of less than 10% and obtain
similar results. These estimations are available upon request
11Overall, the IPC-4 scheme contains about 70,000 entries (classification symbols) arranged in a tree-
like structure. About 10 percent of these groups are main groups (further details are available at:
http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/en/).
17
Herfindhal index for the top 25 IPC classes (k = 1, 25) in which a firm A is patenting:
TECHDIV 25A = 1/
25∑
k=1
(pkA)
2
where
pkA =
NkA∑n
k=1N
k
A
and pkA is the percentage of firm A’s patents in IPC-8 subclass k of the total number of classes
(n) . If k is not among the top 25 patent classes in which A patents, I assume (pkA)
2 → 0, an
assumption that holds in most cases, given the great level of detail of patent data employed.
Hence, a higher value for TECHDIV implies greater diversification, thus more IPC classes
covered by a firms ’patents and a more even spread across these classes. For an example,
see Table 7 in Appendix A. As a robustness test, I also explore other measures of diversity
employed in the literature (technological breadth as the count of IPC-8 classes in which a
firm patents tire technology, an entropy measure, and the sum of the logs of one over the
variable in each class), all with similar results.
Production similarity is captured using the production sets of two prospective partners
in a dyad (A and B). Since these are discrete variables (e.g. tire types produced), I compute
a Jaccard index, defined as the size of the intersection divided by the size of the union of
the two production sets following the formula:
PRODSIMA,B =
TA ∩ TB
TA ∪ TB
where PRODSIMA,B is the computed production similarity score between firm A and firm B
and TA and TB represent their production sets in terms of tire types from A and respectively,
B. Following ERJ’s taxonomy of tires types I consider 9 categories: passenger, light truck,
heavy truck or bus, agricultural, motorcycle, earth mover/all terrain, pneumatic industrial,
aircraft, and racing tires. Most producers tend to specialize, designating specific production
tasks to certain facilities, so that plants that produce more than 3-4 types of tires are quite
rare12. Hence, Tm ∈ 1..9,m = A,B and PRODSIMA,B ∈ (0, 1) with bigger values for
PRODSIMA,B indicating greater similarity between A and B.
I compute the technological distance between two tire producers as an Euclidian distance
in terms of IPC classes in which partners patent most frequently (have a higher propensity
1253 percent of the firms produce maximum three tire types, and only 9 firms worldwide produce 7 or
more types.
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to patent). Thus, the distance between two firms A and B in year t is:
TECHDIST (A,B) =
√√√√ 25∑
k=1
(pAk − p
B
k )
2
where pAk is the percentage of firm A’s patents in IPC subclass k (IPC 8-digit classification),
respectively B’s patents in class k (pBk ). I survey the 25 largest patent classes for each tire
manufacturer, thus if k is outside these top values then pAk and p
B
k equal zero. Since these
percentages do not sum up to one (e.g. a patent might fall into multiple IPC classes) the
resulting distance measure ranges from 0 (totally similar) to 5 (totally different).
3.4 Controls
Most findings in the literature agree on the significance of firm specifics on alliance formation.
Hence, firm size impacts the degree of technology production and sharing (Bayona et al.,
2001; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003; Gambardella et al., 2007), although controlling for techno-
logical endowments may dissipate this effect (Veugelers, 1997). I employ firms’ production
capacity as a direct measure of their size in the regressions (size) and subsequently use also
other variables (e.g. number of plants, employees) as proxies for size, with similar results
to the ones reported here. Firm’s age is computed using the opening year of its first plant.
Within our sample the median age is around 50 years, consistent with a mature industry.
Technological portfolios facilitate the creation and diffusion of new technologies, cross-
fertilization of ideas between alliances partners, and improvements in absorptive capacity
of firms (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). To quantify firms’ technological capabilities, I follow
prior studies and proxy it using international patent stocks. To compute patent stocks for
all firms in the industry I use USPTO patent grants (patents) and the perpetual inventory
method with an annual discount rate of 15 percent, common in the literature. Similar results
are obtained using Derwent domestic patent data, which has a global coverage but is less
suitable for international comparisons due to existing differences across national patenting
regulations and fees.
Moreover, the success of inter-firm partnerships is conditioned by participants’ capacity
to learn and adapt to each other’s way of doing business, while taking advantage of their
counterparts’ abilities. In such situations, prior or existent ties between firms increase the
efficiency of a link through relational routines (Dyer and Singh, 1998) and greater trust
base (Gulati, 1995b), leading to faster technological cross-learning (Kale et al., 2000). Thus,
the existence of formal ties and higher degrees of integration (e.g. majority holdings or
joint-venture projects, as opposed to minority ones) determine the amount and quality of
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technologies exchanged between two firms. These formal ties between firms are coded using
a set of dummies that equal one if one of the firms is a minority holding, majority holding,
or a joint venture13.
3.5 Estimation technique
In our dataset, the two dependent variables are observed binary outcomes, namely whether
two firms form an exploitation alliance or not, and respectively whether they form an ex-
ploration alliance or not. These two outcomes are both explained by the same vectors X
and D of variables listed in Equation 1, which include exogenous firm-specific and dyadic-
specific factors featured in our hypotheses along with relevant controls, therefore, requiring
a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach:
y∗EXP,it = βEXP + β
′
X,EXP ∗Xit + β
′
D,EXP ∗Dit + ǫEXP,it (2)
y∗EXR,it = βEXR + β
′
X,EXR ∗Xit + β
′
D,EXR ∗Dit + ǫEXR,it (3)
ρ = Cov(ǫEXP,it, ǫEXR,it) (4)
The (latent) dependent variable y∗TAL,it represents the type of technological alliance (TAL)
that a dyad i of firms A and B opts for in year t (i.e., exploitation-EXP or exploration-EXR),
and this translates into the observed outcome yTAL,it as follows:
yTAL,it =


1 if y∗TAL,it > 0
0 otherwise
, TAL = EXP,EXR
There are two potential problems in estimating these regressions. The first issue is ac-
counting for potential interdependencies between these two types of alliances, given the
prevalence of one or both strategies in firm behavior (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006). Thus, a
non-zero and statistically significant ρ indicates that the two likelihoods are jointly deter-
mined and requires specific econometric tools to account for this interdependence. A second
concern refers to the endogeneity surrounding the decision to form an alliance. Commonly,
the literature on alliance formation conceptualizes this self-selection as a two-stage process
(Stuart, 2000): first, firms decide whether to engage in an alliance given the perceived op-
portunities or threats (i.e., technological assets, experience, strategic intent, competitive
pressures, etc.) and second, to seek an appropriate partner that meets best their specific
needs. Intuitively, this self-selection into an alliance falls into the type of endogeneity ad-
13The omitted category here is no relationship
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dressed by the seminal work of Heckman (1979). However, the non-linearity of binary models
is not appropriate for such two-step corrections for which no appropriate distributions are
readily available, and may result in wrong conclusions and a larger bias (Freedman and
Sekhon, 2010).
To address these concerns, I have opted for a bivariate probit model which controls for self-
selection issues using the Conditional Mixed Process (CMP) model developed by Roodman
(2011). CMP builds on the well-established system of seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
in a recursive simultaneous equation system that employ maximum likelihood (ML) methods.
It allows for both contemporaneous correlation between the error terms of Equations (2) and
(3), and controls for selection biases which occur as a result of unobserved variables that affect
both alliance outcomes (Oxley and Sampson, 2004). In addition to a regular bivariate probit,
which already outperforms linear instrumental variable approaches in dealing with selection
issues (Chiburis et al., 2012), the CMP also allows for explicit, Heckman-type, sample-
selection controls. In CMP, sample selection is modeled for the full dataset, and in parallel
with modeling of a dependent variable of interest for the subset with complete observations
(Roodman, 2011). Furthermore, for repeated observations, there is an opportunity to opt
for a sandwich variance estimator that accounts for clustering. Given all these desirable
properties of CMP that tackle the above mentioned issues, I employ this estimator for my
main empirical results.
4 Results
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics, while Table 4 presents the matrix of paired correla-
tions for the main variables, all of which are within acceptable limits. The base results have
been produced using the -cmp- command in Stata 13. All estimations use a SUR bivariate
probit estimator and include heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation consistent standard er-
rors clustered on the dyad. The last three rows of Table 1 report the results of Wald tests
regarding the interdependence of Equations (2) and (3), and the correlations between the
error term in the baseline model of exploitation (ρ1) and respectively, exploration (ρ2), and
the error term in the selection equation. These results suggest that the error terms of the
two alliance equations are significantly correlated, recommending the bivariate probit as the
appropriate estimation technique. Moreover, selection issues appear more prevalent in the
case of exploration alliances.
The selection stage equation describes whether the two firms in dyad have formed a
technological alliance or not. The selection model hinges on at least one valid exclusion
restriction in order to be estimated. Following prior literature, I consider that the size, age
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Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
controls only H1a and H1b H2a and H2b H3a and H3b all
Exploit Explore Exploit Explore Exploit Explore Exploit Explore Exploit Explore Exploit Explore
Selection equation
Log size firm1 0.275*** 0.272*** 0.267*** 0.279*** 0.278*** 0.277***
[0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
Log size firm2 0.082*** 0.089*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.095*** 0.094***
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.013]
Age firm1 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.087*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.063***
[0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014]
Age firm2 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.012 0.004 0.003
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.010]
Log patents firm1 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Log patents firm2 -0.001+ -0.001** -0.002** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
Outcome equation
Log patents firm1 -0.036*** 0.288*** -0.021*** 0.347*** -0.016*** 0.285*** -0.019*** 0.364*** -0.014** 0.310*** -0.022*** 0.344***
[0.006] [0.032] [0.006] [0.031] [0.006] [0.027] [0.006] [0.041] [0.007] [0.031] [0.008] [0.070]
Log patents firm2 -0.056*** 0.267*** -0.107*** 0.238*** -0.069*** 0.198*** -0.112*** 0.220*** -0.113*** 0.207*** -0.073*** 0.190***
[0.009] [0.028] [0.008] [0.027] [0.008] [0.027] [0.008] [0.031] [0.008] [0.027] [0.010] [0.034]
Time trend 0.000 -0.021 -0.011** 0.017 0.000 -0.018 -0.001 -0.021 0.010 -0.05 -0.006 0.009
[0.005] [0.027] [0.005] [0.026] [0.005] [0.024] [0.005] [0.030] [0.006] [0.030] [0.007] [0.053]
Minority holding 0.019 1.160*** 0.015 -0.122 0.061+ 0.670*** 0.038 0.096 0.013 -0.092 0.054 0.253
[0.036] [0.363] [0.035] [0.266] [0.035] [0.229] [0.036] [0.622] [0.040] [0.545] [0.040] [0.888]
Majority holding 0.324*** 2.426*** 0.278*** 1.838*** 0.320*** 2.174*** 0.271*** 1.777*** 0.235*** 1.764*** 0.272*** 2.268***
[0.035] [0.249] [0.037] [0.254] [0.035] [0.173] [0.035] [0.190] [0.039] [0.247] [0.045] [0.459]
Joint-venture 0.021 1.064 0.011 -0.218 0.020 0.350 0.082** 1.144*** 0.070+ -0.013 0.037 0.220
[0.036] [0.652] [0.035] [0.418] [0.035] [0.517] [0.036] [0.416] [0.038] [0.943] [0.040] [1.313]
No data firm1 0.035 -0.231 -0.04 -0.076 -0.002 -0.469*** 0.000 -0.092 0.003 -0.208 -0.034 -0.023
[0.027] [0.145] [0.026] [0.132] [0.026] [0.125] [0.027] [0.182] [0.030] [0.137] [0.041] [0.036]
No data firm2 0.029 -0.441*** 0.096*** -0.356*** 0.052** -0.807*** 0.061*** -0.527*** 0.030 -0.403*** 0.080*** -0.400***
[0.021] [0.142] [0.020] [0.121] [0.021] [0.119] [0.021] [0.142] [0.023] [0.124] [0.024] [0.148]
Corporate diversif firm1 0.002*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.011***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.001] [0.002]
Corporate diversif firm2 -0.004*** 0.009*** -0.004*** 0.008***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.003]
Tech diversif firm1 0.001*** 0.019*** 0.001** 0.019***
[0.000] [0.003] [0.001] [0.004]
Tech diversif firm2 -0.006*** 0.009*** -0.005*** 0.011**
[0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.006]
Product similarity 0.142*** -0.210 0.156*** -0.106
[0.038] [0.220] [0.064] [0.102]
Tech distance 0.178 -0.090*** 0.258 -0.086***
[0.141] [0.026] [0.201] [0.034]
Tech distance2 -0.022 0.019*** -0.052 0.021**
[0.032] [0.006] [0.056] [0.010]
N 356,899 356,899 356,899 356,899 356,899 356,899
Log-likelihood -5329.74 -5206.12 -5234.62 -5241.85 -5209.53 -5151.41
LR Chi2 4195.89 4443.11 4386.11 4371.48 4294.13 4410.36
Wald test (ρ = 0) -1.236*** -0.822*** -0.862*** -0.821*** -0.984*** -0.984***
Wald test (ρ1 = 0) 0.034 -0.086+ 0.002 -0.076 -0.036 -0.096
Wald test (ρ2 = 0) 0.558+ 0.998*** 0.894** 1.061** 0.813*** 0.915***
Table 1: Determinants of technological alliances: Biprobit SUR models with selection
Notes: The dependent variable equals 1 for successful formation of an exploitation, respectively exploration, technological alliance, and 0 otherwise; All models include a
constant, not reported due to space constraints; The ”no data” dummies to control for missing sales data for providers and recipients; †, ** and *** indicate variables that are
significant at the 10%, 5% and respectively 1%; z-scores are reported in squared brackets
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(or tenure) and technological assets (in the form of patent stocks) of both firms in the dyad
to be indicative of whether they are likely to form an alliance of any type (Stuart, 2000).
Further, I expect that the size and age of firms will affect their propensity to engage in
alliances, but not the type of alliances they form. Thus, I use firms’ size and age as exclusion
restrictions in the first stage of the bivariate probit estimations14.
Table 1 displays the main results. From the upper part of the table we can see that size of
both firms has a positive and significant effect on their alliance participation, tenure appears
to be a prerequisite only for one firm in the dyad, and technological capabilities are both a
stimulus and a deterrent for certain firms to enter alliances. To reconcile these apparently
contradictory findings, I have ran some additional estimations. These robustness checks
with separate probit models for each type of alliance (exploitation/exploration) and also
simple biprobits reveal that, on average, exploitation alliances form between complementary
partners (i.e., providers of technologies are often bigger, older firms with larger techno-
logical endowments, whereas technology recipients are smaller, less endowed, and younger
firms), while exploration alliances occur between similar partner (larger, younger and more
technologically-active firms), which is in line with our expectations. These additional checks
provide an intuitive explanation for the first stage results of the selection equation.
Moving to the lower part of Table 1, I will discuss now the outcome equation which
estimates the effect of our hypothesized and control variables on dyads’ propensity to form
either an exploitation or an exploration alliance. I start with a basic specification (Model 1)
that incorporates only firm controls (technological capabilities of both provider and recipient,
and existing relationship, if any, between them), two dummies for no availability of sales
data, and a trend variable to capture any potential heterogeneity in formation of alliances
across time. This specification will serve throughout the paper as a benchmark for testing
the proposed hypotheses. The results confirm that firms who self-select into forming an
alliance are more likely to opt for exploration, and less likely to opt for exploitation, if they
poses more significant technological capabilities, as proxied by larger patent stocks. Formal
ties between tire producers increase their chances of exchanging technology and this effect
is amplified by the degree of integration, so that the likelihood of a technology transfer is
higher for a majority holding than a joint-venture or a minority holding. Firms for which
no sales data is available (i.e., outside the top 75 largest tire manufacturers worldwide) are
less likely to form an exploration alliance, consistent with their relative position within the
industry.
Models 2 and 3 explore the hypothesized effects of firms’ diversification profiles. Corpo-
14Although I cannot test the validity of the exclusion restrictions, the coefficients of these variables turned
out to be mostly not significant statistically when estimated in a simple bivariate probit
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rate diversification of firms has a positive effect for firms’ engagement in exploitative alliances
as providers of technologies and a negative one as technology recipients, supporting hypothe-
sis H1a. This suggests that firms who are better diversified outside the tire domain, are more
likely to set up technological alliances for exploitation. Likewise, the effects of technological
diversification on firms’ propensity to engage in exploitation diverge, with a positive and
a negative effect on firm’s to form an alliance within any given dyad. In accordance with
our H1b, both higher corporate and technological diversification are associated with greater
probability to enter exploration alliances. Together, these results confirm that diversification
profiles of firms are valuable signals for prospective partners and good predictors for firms’
involvement in alliances.
In terms of the hypothesized effects of dyadic characteristics on alliance formation, the
results commend product similarity (as measured by the Jaccard index) as a strong predictor
of exploitative technological partnerships (Model 4), thereby confirming hypothesis H2a.
Thus, firms that set up exploitation alliances (e.g., distribution, production or supply agree-
ments in return for technological assistance) are likely to share a common base of products
which would enable immediate use of this technologies. On the other hand, technological
similarity of firms is not significantly related to exploitation (Model 5) confirming that the
potential for immediate application of technologies (proxied by a wider range of common
products) is more important for exploitation alliances. As a side note, although Hypothesis
3a was postulating a linear effect for technological distance in the case of exploitation, the bi-
variate probit results reported inModel 5 include also the squared term, which was needed
for testing H3b. Additional estimations without the squared terms confirm that technological
distance has no significant effect on the propensity to form exploitation alliances.
Interestingly, while product relatedness of prospective partners matters for exploitation
but technological one does not, the reverse is true in the case of exploration. According to the
results, firms that engage more in exploration benefit from similar technological capabilities.
Technological distance between prospective partners has a significant negative effect on their
propensity to form an exploration alliance. However, consistent with H3b, this effect is
nonlinear suggesting that there are decreasing returns to scale from technological similarity.
Thus, when it comes to exploration, firms need to meet a certain technological threshold in
order to engage successfully in these partnerships and to create new knowledge and produce
radical innovations. Yet, a complete overlap in terms of technology portfolios leaves little
room for cross-fertilization, thereby reducing the appeal for exploration alliances. Finally, all
variables are incorporated in the full model (Model 6) with similar prescriptions for both
exploitation and exploration.
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4.1 Robustness checks
To further validate these findings, I perform additional checks that target several key as-
pects. Specifically, I include country fixed-effects (to address the unobserved effects of cross-
country heterogeneity), run the analysis in various sub-samples of the dataset (e.g., exclude
sequentially the biggest firms in the industry), use a more conservative measure of alliance
formation (i.e., ”new” alliances, defined as longstanding technological agreements between
partners that have not been engaged in the past), and employ other estimation methods
and control variables. These results are not reported here due to space constraints, but are
available upon request.
The country fixed-effects estimations are carried out via simple probit models (as opposed
to biprobits) and they pretty much wipe out the impact of firm size and weaken the signifi-
cance of the recipients’ corporate diversification, while emphasizing the effects of inter-firm
ties (minority, majority or JV holdings) for alliance formation. The gradual exclusion of
the big tire producers (top 3, and then top 5) indicates that within such sub-samples both
providers and recipients are less technological diversified. The analysis of different samples
(before and after 1992, as the median year in my dataset) reveals that smaller firms and
minority holdings were more inclined to share technologies between 1986 and 1991 than the
following period. Moreover, employing a more conservative measure for alliance formation
by analyzing only ”new” agreements (defined as technology exchanges between two firms
that have not interacted in the past in our sample) draws similar conclusions to the main
analysis. Finally, in light of previous literature, my chosen measure of corporate diversifica-
tion (percent of sales from non-tire products) is relatively close to an unrelated diversification
metric. To complement it, I also employ a different proxy for diversification (i.e., the number
of tire types produced), one that comes closer to related (or within-industry) diversification.
Throughout most of these estimations the coefficient of this variable is positive but not sta-
tistically significant, suggesting that only firms with superior capabilities that were used for
unrelated diversification are able to attract prospective partners for technological alliances.
Furthermore, I check the results against other estimation methods (e.g., multinomial logit,
which allows three choices for each dyad, i.e., 1-exploitation alliance; 2-exploration alliance
and 3- no alliance; and also a simple bivariate probit without selection), data samples (using
a smaller sample that contains all the 1 s and a random draw of 5 percent of zero observations
to minimize the possible bias arising from the large number of zeros) and control variables
15. All these results are in line with my main findings.
15I test several alternative measures for firm size (log number of plants and log number of workers),
technological similarity (tech common) using a dummy variable if the firm employs radial tire technology,
cross-ply or both; technological diversity using tech breadth as the number of IPC-8 classes in which a firm
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5 Discussion and conclusions
This study set out to examine how diversification profiles of firms and their dyadic charac-
teristics affect their observed choices regarding technological alliances. My findings suggest
that extensive corporate and technological diversification profiles signal prospective partners
the existence of superior capabilities, knowledge and resources that can sustain both explo-
ration and exploitation of technological assets via alliances. Moreover, similarities in terms
of product portfolios induce more exploitation, while similarity in terms of technological
assets spurs more exploration, although in a non-linear fashion.
With these findings, this work contributes to the extant literature in several ways. First,
it links conceptually firms’ diversification strategies with their alliance choices complement-
ing prior examinations of the links between internal and external strategies of firms (Giuri
et al., 2004). Specifically, it focuses on two main measures of diversification, namely corpo-
rate and technological, which give a broad picture of firms’ strategies across industries and
technologies. Firms can be extremely successful in one of these dimensions or a combination
of them, which results in different needs and priorities regarding alliances. Second, following
prior work in this area, this study combines firm-level and dyadic-level explanations to ad-
dress the important heterogeneity behind alliance formation (Wang and Zajac, 2007). The
empirical results support this conjecture, indicating that there are both selection and inter-
dependence issues which need to be accounted for upon examining the formation of alliances.
Third, different from most other studies in this area that focus on a single dyadic aspect, this
paper distinguishes between product and technological similarities of prospective partners
and their implication for exploitation and exploration. My results suggest that the relative
position in the product space is more important for exploitation, while technological simi-
larity is crucial for exploration. Finally, this study is set in the context of a global, mature,
and low-tech industry (tires) that usually gets bypassed by the alliance and innovation lit-
erature. While the aggregate R&D intensity of the industry justifies its ”medium low-tech”
label, technology has always played a significant role in the tire domain and it is actively
pursued by the industry’s leaders, which makes it a prime and interesting background for
testing these theoretical conjectures.
Furthermore, these results emphasize different effects of the hypothesized variables on
the propensity to engage in alliances based on the type of technological exchanges observed.
I find that corporate diversifiers (across industries) tend to engage more in technological
alliances either as partners (exploration) or as providers (exploitation). This finding is
in line with both Teece’s (2007) dynamic capability theory and the diversification strategy
patents).
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literature (Granstrand, 2000), indicating that through corporate diversification firms acquire
new knowledge on potential avenues to capitalize their technological assets. Moreover, the
recent surge in inter-firm agreements worldwide suggests that such advantages in terms of
exploitation of technological capabilities have become increasingly important for firms in
today’s competitive and global environment (Makino and Delios, 1996). Furthermore, the
role of technological diversification in formation of exploration alliances is a positive and
robust one, supporting prior findings in the literature (Giuri et al, 2004; Gambardella et
al., 2007). Thus, exploration in technological alliances relies heavily on partners with large
and diversified portfolios as it increases the avenues for learning and collaboration. These
findings reinforce the idea that technological diversity may induce more exploration alliances,
as it mitigates core rigidities and path dependencies existing in firms by proposing novel
solutions that accelerate the rate of innovation (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco,
2008). In contrast, technological diversification appears to attract firms also in exploitative
interactions, as an avenue for immediate efficiency and profitability improvements (March,
1991). On one hand, greater technological diversity yields more opportunities for firms to
cash-in their assets as providers of technologies, while the lack of it limits one’s options
at only acting as a recipient of technology in such exploitative interactions (Narula and
Sadowski, 2002).
In addition to the effects of diversification profiles, alliance formation decisions are also
impacted by dyadic characteristics of firms (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Product similarity is
consistently associated with higher probability of setting up exploitation alliances, as firms
that share the same product space are more likely to find ways to capitalize (i.e., by providing
technology in exchange for non-technological assets or competences) or employ technological
assets (i.e., to better achieve firm’s objectives in terms of production methods, materials,
profitability, etc.). Moreover, this relationship is linear, implying that firms seek partners
from similar product areas to exploit/employ complementary technological assets or com-
petences (Mowery et al., 1996). In contrast, product similarity does not affect significantly
exploration endeavors, as these alliances appear to be driven entirely by technological features
of prospective alliance partners (Rothaermel and Boeker, 2007). As such, large technological
distances discourage exploration alliances, as partners must meet a threshold of technological
endowments and achieve a certain overlap to start a productive technological collaboration.
However, as this overlap increases, the benefits from mutual learning and cross-feeding are
greatly reduced, suggesting a non-linear negative relationship between technological distance
of partners and their propensity to form an exploration alliance (Sampson, 2007; Yang et
al., 2010).
Overall, these findings point out towards a more general trend of complementarity (in
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terms of partner size, age, knowledge, production base and diversification levels) in exploita-
tion alliances. The only exception, and a robust one, is given by the strong positive impact
of product similarity of two firms on their propensity to engage in exploitative agreements.
Moreover, these results are consistent with the application of ”exploration-exploitation”
paradigm to alliance formation (Lavie and Roesenkopf, 2006). Organizational inertia, either
as market position or technological commitments, results in strong preferences for incumbents
towards exploitation of existing assets (Rothaermel, 2001). Oppositely, partner similarity
along all dimensions (age, size, technological portfolio, production portfolio, diversification
strategies), except technological assets, is a strong driver of exploration alliances that involve
bilateral technology exchanges and mutual learning (Sampson, 2007). Given the significant
dispersion in terms of innovation and R&D efforts between large and small firms in the tire
industry (Acs and Audretsch, 1987), seeking strong technological partners is not surprising
(Bayona et al., 2001)16. Firms that engage partners in R&D activities will pursue knowledge
sharing and development of new technologies and products (Rothaermel, 2001), while those
who seek to exploit their technological assets will opt for more hierarchical agreements with
unidirectional flows of technologies to their partners in exchange for access to production
facilities, marketing or supply agreements, and other non-technological benefits (Rothaermel
and Deeds, 2004).
In terms of managerial implications, my results suggest that technology exploration
and exploitation via alliances presents firms with both opportunities and challenges. Well-
diversified enterprises that are able to harness new knowledge across different markets will
have greater appeal and opportunities for more alliances. Likewise, diverse technological
portfolios will present greater opportunities for exploration and trigger subsequently supe-
rior economic performance (Sampson, 2007). Therefore, firms should invest strategically in
achieving greater diversification across markets and technologies, as these actions will sub-
sequently present firms with more external opportunities for exploration and exploitation.
Moreover, the characteristics of prospective partners are indicative of the type of alliance
preferred. Dyadic similarities in terms of products provide the necessary absorptive capa-
bility and channels for communication of technological content, thus favoring exploitative
interactions. In turn, firms seeking to learn and develop new technologies via exploration
alliances should focus on similar partners with sizable, yet different technological portfolios
from their own.
The present study has, of course, several shortcomings that may serve as premises for
subsequent work in this area. First, despite its global reach and longitudinal dimension, this
16According to Acs and Audretsch (1987) the rate of innovation in large tire producers exceeds that of
small-firms by more than 8, or about 8 innovations per thousand of employees
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analysis is confined to a single industry which is characterized by a lower number of techno-
logical actors, as compared to a younger, tech-intensive and atomistic industry populated by
many R&D intensive firms (e.g., semiconductors). Inherently, this affects the richness and
structure of alliance data, so that it is likely to have more exploration in high-tech indus-
tries than otherwise. Second, this work focuses exclusively on the within-industry dimension
of technological alliances, dictated by the link between our diversification measures, which
are all relative to the tire industry. Future extensions of this work could adopt different
measures of diversification (e.g., international) and also examine the intra-industry alliances
of tire producers to shed light on the links between vertical integration strategies and firm
diversification profiles. Such additions may provide a complete and perhaps different picture
of alliance activities for tire producers, as they vary or balance their exploration-exploitation
strategies across contingent industries and countries. Finally, the issues pertaining to data
availability and accuracy are important, especially in the case of firms from developing na-
tions in the 1980s. These problems were addressed where possible through backward revisions
of data as new and more reliable statistics were published in the European Rubber Journal17.
In conclusion, this study provides some interesting insights on the interplay between
firm diversification, dyadic characteristics and the formation of alliances in the context of
a mature, low-tech sector. Further inquiries are needed to gain a better understanding of
the motivation and outcomes of such inter-firm connections, and how they possibly differ
from the ”mainstream” conclusions derived from high-tech industries. Such extensions could
include comparative studies on other low or medium-tech industries, careful documentation
of the alliance terms, and complete tracking of historical collaborations between firms. Some
of these mature industries still exhibit a high technological turnover among the leading
companies, but most importantly, represent the backbone of all economies in the world.
Thus, understanding the motivation and benefits of such interactions may yield important
policy lessons for both developed and developing nations in which mature industries are still
responsible for a large share of GDP and employment.
17For example many Chinese firms are not reported in the 1980s and early 1990s, although they show up
in later statistics with plants dating back to the 1970s
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Year Countries Firms Plants Avg. Plants per Firm Tech alliance Patent percent
1985 77 208 368 1.77 75 9.14
1986 77 216 383 1.77 82 9.80
1987 77 218 391 1.79 96 9.13
1988 79 233 401 1.72 101 10.36
1989 80 235 410 1.74 104 9.01
1990 77 238 412 1.73 115 8.81
1991 83 261 417 1.60 122 8.30
1992 84 266 424 1.59 138 8.17
1993 82 288 426 1.48 132 7.19
1994 84 306 449 1.47 144 7.07
1995 84 306 452 1.48 143 6.73
1996 81 310 467 1.51 130 5.96
Table 2: Snapshot of the global tire industry (1985–1996)
Notes: Tech alliance refers to the total number of active technological alliances in a certain year; Patent percent refers to the
percentage of firms of the total having patents in that year
Variable Description Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exploit dummy for exploitation technological alliance 356,899 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00
Explore dummy for exploration technological alliance 356,899 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Log size firm log production capacity (tonnes/year) 356,899 9.71 1.46 4.46 17.55
Age firm firm age (years) 356,899 50.13 22.81 10.00 124.00
Log patents firm log USPTO patent stock 356,899 0.24 0.95 0.00 6.00
Minority holding dummy for minority holdings 356,899 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Majority holding dummy for majority holdings 356,899 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Joint-venture dummy for joint ventures 356,899 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00
Corporate diversif firm percentage of sales from non-tire products 356,899 25.36 11.52 0.00 98.00
Tech diversif firm inverse Herfindhal top 25 IPC-8 patent classes 356,899 1.70 5.09 1.00 76.92
Product similarity Jaccard index of tire types produced 356,899 0.42 0.28 0.00 1.00
Tech distance Euclidian distance top 25 IPC-8 patent classes 356,899 1.77 1.52 0.00 4.00
Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Notes: For this statistic list-wise deletion of missing values was used; Product similarity and Tech distance are dyadic constructs
using values for both firms in a dyad, while the rest of the variables refer to all the firms in the dataset; given that I consider
all possible pairs of firms they are symmetric for firm 1 and firm 2 in a dyad)
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No Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Exploit 1.000
2 Explore -0.001 1.000
3 Log size firm1 0.053 0.027 1.000
4 Log size firm2 -0.003 0.020 -0.003 1.000
5 Age firm1 0.045 0.022 0.484 0.001 1.000
6 Age firm2 -0.005 0.012 0.001 0.484 0.011 1.000
7 Log patents firm1 0.121 0.069 0.397 -0.002 0.310 0.000 1.000
8 Log patents firm2 -0.003 0.035 -0.002 0.397 0.000 0.310 -0.004 1.000
9 Minority holding 0.188 0.068 0.025 0.003 0.021 0.003 0.066 0.006 1.000
10 Majority holding 0.083 0.335 0.022 0.013 0.022 0.008 0.062 0.012 0.000 1.000
11 Joint-venture 0.228 0.033 0.027 -0.004 0.025 -0.006 0.066 -0.003 0.000 0.000 1.000
12 Corporate diversif firm1 0.022 0.014 0.036 0.002 0.165 0.013 0.137 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.001 1.000
13 Corporate diversif firm2 -0.011 0.019 0.002 0.025 0.013 0.157 0.001 0.126 0.000 0.013 -0.004 0.009 1.000
14 Tech diversif firm1 0.074 0.061 0.200 0.000 0.201 0.003 0.506 -0.002 0.073 0.051 0.058 0.068 0.003 1.000
15 Tech diversif firm2 -0.004 0.044 0.000 0.200 0.003 0.201 -0.002 0.506 0.008 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.061 -0.004 1.000
16 Product similarity 0.014 0.003 0.119 0.119 0.088 0.088 0.021 0.021 0.008 0.004 -0.002 -0.072 -0.074 0.025 0.025 1.000
17 Tech distance 0.016 -0.014 0.119 0.119 0.082 0.082 0.060 0.060 0.007 0.011 0.007 -0.021 -0.024 0.043 0.043 0.199 1.000
Table 4: Paired correlations
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Technology flows Technology flows
Country Providers Recipients Country Providers Recipients
Angola - 2 Netherlands 2 2
Argentina - 1 New Zeeland - 1
Australia - 3 Nigeria - 2
Austria - 2 Norway - 1
Canada 2 - Pakistan - 4
Chile - 2 Peru - 3
China - 32 Philippines - 6
Colombia - 3 Poland - 4
Costa Rica - 2 Portugal 2 4
Czech Republic 2 1 Russia - 4
Czechoslovakia 2 8 Slovak Republic - 2
Ecuador - 1 Slovenia 1 2
Egypt - 3 South Africa 12 7
Ethiopia - 1 Sri Lanka - 4
Finland - 1 Sweden 2 4
France 20 5 Taiwan - 9
Germany 32 13 Tanzania - 1
Ghana - 2 Thailand - 7
Hungary - 4 Trinidad and Tobago - 1
India - 22 Tunisia - 1
Indonesia - 12 Turkey - 8
Iran - 4 USSR - 1
Iraq - 1 United Kingdom 35 5
Italy 26 1 United States 91 24
Ivory Coast - 1 Uruguay - 3
Japan 60 10 Venezuela - 1
Kenya - 3 West Germany 3 5
Korea, Republic 5 6 Yugoslavia 2 7
Malaysia 3 18 Zaire - 1
Mexico - 10 Zambia - 2
Morocco - 2 Zimbabwe - 2
Mozambique - 2
Table 5: Geographic distribution of technological alliances (1985-1996)
Note: ”Provider” and ”Recipient” represent the count of alliances formed firms from a given country involved in either ex-
ploitation alliances (characterized by one-way flows of technology, and counted as one for Providers and one for Recipients) or
an exploration alliance (characterized by bilateral exchanges of technologies, and counted as two for Recipients)
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Type of agreement Participants Coding Tech Additional Information Source
Minority cross-ownership Continental AG of Germany
and Toyo Tire and Rubber
of Japan
EXP No Continental acquired a 30% stake in Ryoto, a sub-
sidiary of Toyo Tire and Rubber. In return, Toyo
agreed to take minority holdings in two plants
owned by Continental’s subsidiaries. The compa-
nies hope to share production capacity thus en-
large their markets.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cessed May 2010
JV establishment Continental AG of Ger-
many, its subsidiary Gen-
eral Tire (USA) and Grupo
Carso SAB de CV (Mexico)
EXP No Grupo Carso and General Tire each contributed
two plants to the new company, in which Grupo
Carso was to hold a majority controlling interest.
The venture wants to be the largest Mexican tire
manufacturer and service network.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cessed May 2010
Strategic alliance Grupe Michelin of France
and Continental AG of Ger-
many
EXP No The name of the 50-50% JV is Michelin-
Continential Projects and it aims to produce tires
in Europe and enforce the competitiveness of the
two, which will continue to remain competitors.
The venture is expected to save each of them
around $57 million US.
SDC Platinum, Ac-
cessed May 2010
Collaborative agreement Cooper Tire & Rubber of
USA and the ContiTech
Group of Germany
EXR Yes For technical assistance, licensing agreements, and
design plus development cooperation; it covers
projects in areas such as automotive vibration con-
trol, hose products and weather sealing.
Rubber World, Apr
1995, Vol. 212, Issue
1, p.14.
Supply agreement Goodyear (USA) and Sum-
itomo (Japan)
EXP No Products covered in this agreement: replacement
tires
Freedonia Group
(1998)
Strategic alliance Pirelli SpA of Italy and
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co.
of USA
EXP Yes Cooper will handle sales and distribution of Pirelli
tires in North America, where Cooper is better
positioned, while Pirelli will handle Cooper’s sale
in South America, where it has a strong presence.
Cooper will also send personnel to Pirelli’s Han-
ford, CA, tire plant, to help straighten out its fail-
ing operation. Also technological exchanges are
involved.
Rubber & Plastics
News; Apr. 2002, Vol.
31 Issue 19, p8.
Collaborative agreement Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co. of USA and Group
Michelin SA of France
EXR Yes This agreement aims at setting an industry stan-
dard and broadening the appeal and availability
for run-flat tires; it consists of jointly operated
R&D operations based in the Netherlands and
license each other’s respective run-flat technolo-
gies.Goodyear has developed run-flat technology
that mounts on a conventional rim, while Michelin
has an integrated wheel-and-tire system.
Wall Street Journal.
(Eastern edition).
New York, N.Y.: Jun
23, 2000. pg. 1.
Outsourcing Continetal AG of Germany
and Metro Tyres Ltd. Of
India
EXP Yes Continental will outsource many of its motorcycle
and scooter tires to Metro Tyres’ dedicated new
plant in Ludhiana, India. Also, the partners have
signed long-term agreements covering both off-take
production and technological support (US $10m).
Rubber & Plastics
News, November 4,
2002
JV establishment Yokohama Rubber (50%) of
Japan and Continental AG
(50%) of Germany
EXP Yes To promote Continental tires to Japanese and Ko-
rean automakers. They also signed a contract for
exchanging tire technology. (US$ 100m)
Rubber World, Mar
2002, Vol. 225 Issue 6,
p12.
Strategic alliance Michelin Group of France
and Hankook Tire Co. Ltd
of South Korea
EXP Yes Michelin will purchase a 10% stake in the company,
which controls 46% of the Korean tire market. In
addition, from 2004 the two companies will join to
manufacture Michelin tires in Hankook’s existing
facilities. In a separate deal, Michelin has agreed
to provide its Run-flat technology to Hankook.
China & North East
Asia Monitor, Aug.
2003, Vol. 10 Issue 8,
p7.
Licesing agreement Groupe Michelin of France
and Toyo Tire & Rubber
Co. Ltd of Japan
EXP Yes The agreements provides Toyo with the most ad-
vanced runflat technology (PAX) despite having
developed its own runflat tire in the past.Toyo
becomes the fourth PAX licensee after Pirelli,
Goodyear and Sumitomo Rubber.
European Rubber
Journal, Jun 2004,
Vol. 186, Issue 6, p8.
Licesing agreement Qingdao Qizhou Rubber
Co. Ltd of China and
Amerityre Corp. of USA
EXP Yes Qingdao Qizhou has signed a license agreement
with Amerityre Corp. to make polyurethane elas-
tomer retreads for three large-size OTR mining
tyres. (US$ 0.4m)
Urethanes Technol-
ogy; Oct/Nov 2006,
Vol. 23, Issue 5, p19.
JV establishement Pirelli SpA of Italy and the
Russian Technologies State
Corporation
EXP No The agreement includes construction of a new in-
dustrial complex for production of car and truck
tyres by 2010 in the Russian region of Samara with
governmental support (US$ 300m).
European Rubber
Journal, Nov/Dec
2008, Vol. 190, Issue
6, p10.
Table 6: Examples of alliances between tire producers
Note: The details of these agreements were collected from various sources listed in the last column. Only those that incorporate
technology exchanges (Tech) and have been signed between 1985 and 1996 are the object of this study; In terms of coding,
EXP corresponds to exploitation and EXR for exploration.
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Tire Industry Michelin Bridgestone Goodyear
Rank IPC Class % Patents IPC Class % Patents IPC Class % Patents IPC Class % Patents
1 B60C-001/00 8.49% B60C-019/00 12.66% B60C-001/00 7.66% B60C-001/00 27.76%
2 C08K-003/00 6.95% B60C-001/00 12.43% C08K-003/00 6.61% C08L-009/00 18.93%
3 B60C-023/02 5.97% B60C-023/02 11.71% G02F-001/01 6.01% C08K-003/00 16.40%
4 B60C-023/00 5.36% B60C-023/04 10.51% B60C-011/04 5.25% C08K-005/00 13.09%
5 C08L-009/00 5.18% B60C-023/00 9.68% G02F-001/167 5.20% B60C-011/00 12.78%
6 B60C-005/00 4.53% B60C-009/18 8.36% B60C-011/00 4.79% B29D-030/06 12.46%
7 B60C-019/00 4.52% C08K-003/00 8.12% B60C-009/18 4.74% B29D-030/00 10.73%
8 B60C-023/04 4.48% G01M-017/02 8.12% B60C-009/00 4.44% B60C-009/00 10.73%
9 C08K-005/00 4.48% C08L-009/00 7.77% B60C-009/20 4.39% C08K-003/36 10.25%
10 B60C-011/00 4.42% B60C-009/20 7.05% C08K-005/00 4.32% B29D-030/08 9.78%
Herfindhal 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.31
Table 7: Levels of technological diversification and specialization patterns for the industry as a whole, and the ”Big Three” tire
producers (Top ten IPC-8 subclasses)
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